How Climate Change and Political Unrest Created a Famine in Sudan

The war in Ukraine has drastically raised the price of food, worsening an already dire situation in Sudan. 

Children in Bahr El Ghazal, Sudan wait for food from the World Food Programme. United Nations Photo. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Famine was officially declared in Sudan more than five years ago, due to a variety of factors which range from climate change to political unrest. South Sudan was engaged in a civil war for  roughly five years from 2013, which tragically left about 4,000 people dead and a staggering four million displaced and fleeing. While a ceasefire was reached in 2018, peace was rocky and sporadic attacks continued to make production nearly impossible for Sudanese farmers.

With famine being officially declared in 2017, the suffering still raged on in 2019, when extreme rain and flooding began to hit Sudan. The flooding continues in 2022, as the global political situation only makes matters worse in Sudan. The war between Ukraine and Russia has had an impact on Sudan in a number of ways. With over half of Sudan’s wheat being exported from the Black Sea region in Turkey, the war has caused food prices to skyrocket. Additionally, food aid programs are primarily focusing their efforts on Ukraine at the moment. While Ukraine clearly needs aid as well, Sudan has been all but abandoned and ignored in this dire moment due to global attention to other political conflicts. 

What used to be a market in Thonyor, Sudan. DFID - UK Department for International Development. CC BY 2.0. 

CBS News interviewed a Sudanese mother, Nyabany Kong, who reported not having eaten in two weeks. Like many others, she had to flee her home, which was subject to torrential floods that completely destroyed her farm. Kong has also lost her husband and her other child to this flooding and famine. Kong’s horrifying story is one of thousands. 

Get Involved

Unfortunately, Sudan’s situation has been exacerbated severely by aid organizations lacking funds due to massive allocation to Ukraine. The best way to get involved is to donate to food relief organizations such as The World Food Programme, which is trying to get as much food as possible to Sudan, but simply doesn’t have the funds to do so. If monetary donations are not an option, simply spreading the word about the crisis and suffering in Sudan is also essential. Unfortunately, the western world often gets weary when spreading awareness, and suffering continues without any attention. The war in Ukraine has also required a lot of attention and money, which has drained Sudan of aid even more than before. Doing your own research about this conflict and then alerting the people in your life to the critical need in Sudan can also help organizations deliver the resources that are needed.

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Calliana Leff

Calliana is currently an undergraduate student at Boston University majoring in English and minoring in psychology. She is passionate about sustainability and traveling in an ethical and respectful way. She hopes to continue her writing career and see more of the world after she graduates. 

The Glaring Sexism of the Sudanese Revolution

Although the Sudanese revolution was a success, the women of Sudan continue to fight against the sexism that is so latent in their country.

The forefront of the Sudanese revolution. Hind Mekki. CC BY 2.0.

Located in the northeast corner of Africa, Sudan gained its independence in 1956 from British and Egyptian rule. The young country has struggled internally ever since, with a multitude of political and religious divisions between the south and the north which broke out into multiple civil wars. South Sudan formed as the newest nation in the world in 2011, as a result of a majority vote for independence in a referendum created by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Present-day Sudan is majority Muslim, while South Sudan is mostly Christian.

Amid the turmoil which defined Sudan’s geopolitics rose Omar al-Bashir, the last president who was known for his cruel dictatorship, human rights violations and war crimes. Bashir came to power in 1989, overthrowing Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi through a nonviolent coup. His autocratic reign at first introduced Sharia, or Islamic law, thus creating more tensions between the Islamic north and the Christian south. Under Sharia, floggings for adultery and drinking alcohol were commonplace. Through the strict interpretation of Islamic law, women and girls were made victims of political persecution, violence, and genital mutilation. Bashir’s laws were indifferent toward cases of domestic violence against women, child marriage and marital rape. Sudan’s Article 152 of the penal code validated the flogging and imprisonment of women for what they wore. 

Sudanese protesters gathered in December 2018 to confront President Omar al-Bashir’s strict measures for economic relief. Bashir made cuts to bread and fuel subsidies, which exacerbated the dissent which was already festering among citizens. Although the movement was initially made up primarily of men, women soon became the driving force behind the revolution. Women made up about 70% of the protesters and were targeted for gender-based and political violence, including battery and rape, by Sudan’s security forces. 

The success of the coup took the media by storm, but there remained sexist overtones within the movement itself. The Sudanese Professionals Association, which has been organizing resistance against Bashir’s dictatorship throughout all three decades, suggested that female protesters come gather on the streets to clean on a day which was scheduled for a protest. This devalued the women who were fighting alongside men against Bashir’s regime, making them feel dismissed as mere cleaners instead of as members of the  uprising itself. This led to a more pressing concern for women’s rights in Sudan, which have been shot down for decades. 

Taken by me@lana_hago#8aprile pic.twitter.com/o7pDUsQg84

— Lana H. Haroun (@lana_hago) April 8, 2019

A photo of a Sudanese woman, clad in white and towering over the crowds on top of a car, became the icon of the movement itself. Her defiance and resilience moved millions of onlookers around the world, and she became dubbed as “Kandaka,” which refers to the Nubian queens of the Kush kingdom who reigned in Sudan centuries ago. This apparition of gender equality left female protesters disgruntled, as it was sorely evident that women were still oppressed by the patriarchal society in Sudan. 

After the coup, Alaa Salah, the celebrated icon herself, told Time magazine that the Sudanese government still limits the role of women in the legislature. Salah is pushing for 50% female representation in Sudan’s parliament, and works alongside women’s rights activists to change the restrictions placed on women. The public law, which tormented women in Sudan for their behavior and their ways of dressing, was finally repealed in November 2019. Although Sudan’s systemic violence against women is entrenched in its society, women’s rights activists remain optimistic about the progress already seen since the ousting of Omar al-Bashir. 

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RELATED CONTENT:

Sudan Separates Religion and State Following al-Bashir’s Ouster

How Sudan’s Protesters Upped the Ante, and Forced Al-Bashir from Power

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Heather Lim

Heather recently earned her B.A. in Literatures in English from University of California, San Diego. She was editor of the Arts and Culture section of The Triton, a student-run newspaper. She plans on working in art criticism, which combines her love of visual art with her passion for journalism.

Sudan Separates Religion and State Following al-Bashir’s Ouster

The Northeast African nation of Sudan has made the decision to separate religion from the state, dissolving 30 years of governance by Islamic law. The country, which has been attempting to rebuild itself after long periods of colonial rule and political strife, came to this decision in an attempt to quell current tensions between religious and military groups. 

Sudan was formerly under colonial rule by the United Kingdom, though the British did not make their presence in Sudan a physical one. They maintained control by partnering with Egypt through a dual colonial government known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1956). This agreement separated the Muslim-dominated north from the majority-Christian south. As colonial presence grew stronger in the region, so did division along ethnic, socioeconomic, religious and linguistic lines. 

Sudan was able to gain independence in 1956, but the country is still overwhelmed with tensions as its citizens and government continue to reconcile with issues caused by colonization. They eventually led to the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) between the central government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, causing an eventual 2 million deaths and the creation of an independent South Sudan. This conflict was amplified when Omar al-Bashir took office by way of a military coup in 1989 in the middle of this 22-year-long civil war. He ruled for 30 years and did so through the suppression of political opponents as well as violence against the Sudanese people. During his presidency, multiple arrest warrants were issued to al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court on charges including war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as his attacks on citizens in Darfur.

Map of Sudan. Muhammad Daffa Rambe. CC BY-SA 3.0.

Al-Bashir continued to hold his power until April 2019 when, after months of unrest, the Sudanese military toppled him. On Sept. 3, 2020, Sudan issued its declaration to sever ties between mosque and state, saying that, “For Sudan to become a democratic country where the rights of all citizens are enshrined, the constitution should be based on the principle of ‘separation of religion and state,’ in the absence of which the right to self-determination must be respected.”

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Ola A .Alsheikh. CC BY-SA 4.0.

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Abdelaziz al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North rebel group, signed this document together. Additionally, the document emphasizes its effort toward unity with the statement, “Sudan is a multiracial, multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed.” More than simply separating church and state, the declaration gives the country momentum in its push toward unification.   

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Renee Richardson

Renee is currently an English student at The University of Georgia. She lives in Ellijay, Georgia, a small mountain town in the middle of Appalachia. A passionate writer, she is inspired often by her hikes along the Appalachian trail and her efforts to fight for equality across all spectrums. She hopes to further her passion as a writer into a flourishing career that positively impacts others.

Nile Basin States Must Build a Flexible Treaty. Here’s How..

Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt are a step closer to resolving their disputes over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The dam – a huge project on one of the River Nile’s main tributaries, the Blue Nile in Ethiopia – is designed to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. Its reservoir can hold more than 70 billion cubic metres of water. That’s nearly equal to half of the Nile’s annual flow.

Filling the immense reservoir will diminish the flow of the Nile water.

Tensions have been particularly acute between Egypt and Ethiopia because more than 80% of the water reaching Egypt comes from the Blue Nile.

Despite decades of concerted effort, no comprehensive deal between all 11 countries that share the Nile’s river basin has ever been reached. But, after rigorous discussions in the US, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan issued a joint statement that lays the framework for a final agreement. The three countries agreed that the dam would be filled in stages, and that it would only take place in the wet season.

The framework also underscored the need for any agreement to be open to changes. This is important because the three countries must consider changes in weather patterns, among other factors, while developing the final draft.

Instead of allocating the Nile waters based on the assumption of a fixed, and often too optimistic, perpetual water supply, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt should do it in accordance with the social, economic and changing weather conditions in the Nile basin.

This is extremely important as existing studies and climate change models commonly predict potential changes in weather patterns and temperature.

Changing weather patterns

Studies suggest that there is likely to be an increase in the basin’s average annual temperature. This would lead to greater loss of water due to evaporation. Changes are also expected in the future rainfall, river flow and water availability in the Nile Basin, although there’s less certainty about these.

But there’s enough evidence to point to the need for flexibility around agreements on how the dam will be filled. For example, there must be allowances to respond to scenarios of increased water availability and flooding, or water scarcity and drought.

Building flexible and resilient legal and institutional arrangements into the new treaty is therefore key. These include drought provisions, flexible allocation strategies, amendment and review procedures, termination clauses and recognised river basin organisations.

Flexibility in watercourse treaties, due to the unknown effects of climate change, has been recommended by leading scholars in the field such as Stephen McCaffrey and Itay Fischhendler.

Drought provisions

Drought provisions are a common way to improve the flexibility of treaties. Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt can include special provisions that allow for exceptional circumstances, like severe drought.

To deal with the hardships of the projected extreme drought years, the three countries will need to build more reservoirs and storage capacity. But given the tension the dam has caused, finding agreement on this is likely to be challenging. This is all the more reason to include specific clauses in the treaty about storage.

There should also be flexibility in how much water is allocated, instead of a fixed amount. There are a couple of ways this can be achieved.

A simple way is to require Ethiopia to deliver a minimum flow to Sudan and Egypt to maintain human health and basic ecological functions.

The other option would be a percentage allocation. This would share possible water deficiencies, and surplus, proportionally among the three countries. Each country would get its agreed share of the total in a given year.

This would be the better option because it would respond to both wet and dry conditions.

Amendments and reviews

To make the treaty flexible, it’s also important to provide for amendments and reviews of processes. In this way countries could address unforeseen circumstances.

For instance, Ethiopia promised, under the joint statement, that it will fill the dam’s reservoir during the wet season, generally from July to September. But the wet and dry seasons could change.

The treaty can establish what might “trigger” adjustments or have set times for when a review should occur.

It must also have a termination clause which allows any riparian state to terminate the agreement, with a notice period.

River basin organisations

Managing water across boundaries needs river basin organisations. These are entities entrusted to manage water resources at the basin scale. They’re important because they can help introduce a level of flexibility in the arrangements between the riparian states.

A good example of how this can be done is the role played by a river basin organisation charged with applying the 1944 Colorado Treaty. The organisation was composed of an engineer commissioner from both parties – the US and Mexico – and was able to adapt, amend and extend institutional arrangements, including the main treaty.

In the case of the Nile basin, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have two options.

They can establish a joint body in the treaty that will manage the operations of dams in their respective countries. But this would exclude the other eight Nile riparian countries.

The other, and arguably better, option is to manage all dams through the Nile Basin Commission – an organisation envisaged in the Cooperative Framework Agreement. This was an attempt by riparian states to prepare a basin-wide framework to regulate the inter-state use and management of the Nile River. All the Nile basin states except Egypt and Sudan agreed to it.

This organisation has a wide range of powers, which include the ability to examine and decide how water is best used and distributed. Egypt and Sudan must accede to the framework agreement. And the treaty must empower the body to manage the filling and operation of the dams and reservoirs in the three countries.

Mahemud Tekuya is a JSD/Ph.D candidate, University of the Pacific

THIS ARTICLE WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED ON THE CONVERSATION

Blue Out on Insta

Blue Out on Instagram: Support for Sudan through Social Media Awareness

Sudan Flag Sticker on a Car. pjbury. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Recently, a specific shade of blue has been popping up around Instagram in the form of profile pictures. This Blue Out was started by Instagram influencer Shahd (@hadyouatsalaam). She is a Sudanese-born, New York City-based activist—or how she likes to identify herself, “a political scientist by degree and a social media influencer by interest”, according to her recent Insta post, introducing herself to her new followers. 

Shahd created this movement for the sole purpose of raising awareness to what is currently going on in Sudan. Protests in Sudan began in December of last year, when there was a price-spike in basic commodities (i.e. bread). It was not until April 11th, after a mass, multi-day sit-in, that the Sudanese people did see the change they wished for. The current President, a man named Omar al-Bashir, and his party were being jailed or put on house arrest. The protestors believed this to be a victory. They were wrong. General Awad Ibn Auf, the Vice President, soon gave a televised statement explaining the new governmental system that was going to be put in place—one run by three separate military factions called the Transitional Military Council (TMC). He stated that they intended to remain in power for two years until the country could elect a new President, also claiming a three-month state of emergency and curfew. The people did not accept these conditions and in under 24 hours, Ibn Auf resigned and General Abdelfattah al-Burhaan become the new chairman.

Since General Abdelfattah al-Burhaan’s new appointment, negotiations between the people and the TMC have been chaotic. Once again being fed up, the Sudaneese people, with the people of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), organized a mass strike from the 28th of May to the 29th. These strikes immediately became violent and the TMC used these mass demonstrations to portray the SPA in a vicious light. On June 3rd, government forces began shooting at the protestors which, reportedly, left 118 dead and many more injured. Since then, an Internet black out has been in place and thus sparked social media outcry.

But why should this matter to us? The answer is simple: because we have the power and the privilege of accessing the Internet with the capable means of shouting loud enough that somebody will listen. Over the past two weeks, because of the uproar on social media, there have been an influx of articles written about what is going on, how long it has been going on, what is the important information that we need to know about the revolution in Sudan. One Instagram user, Rachek Cargle (@rachel,cargle), with the help of “an incredible group of activists” has even composed a masterlist of articles ranging from immediate updates to fundraising efforts, according to her post that calls for any more information to add. 

Unfortunately, with the uproar, there have also been people who cruelly want to capitalize on the movement for clout reasons. Just last week, a post went viral that claimed for every re-post to a page or story, the originators of the account would donate meals to the Sudanese people. Very soon, the page was labeled as a hoax given curious peoples’ inquiries into how they would provide the food, where is the funding coming from, and other questions which the page either did not answer or gave vague responses to. From these instances, it is important to remember that when trying to get information out, there needs to be a more thorough and conscious effort on the part of other social media users to not just mindlessly click-and-post, but rather, do a quick search about what the post is, and then determine whether or not it is legitimate. 

Using the privilege we have—whether it be from simply having the means to repost an article or getting in contact with local government officials so they can talk about what is going on—is a butterfly-effect that will change how the Sudanese revolution will go. Being complacent or a bystander is just as harmful as supporting the violence because inaction is not action, inaction does not bring about change but lets things remain as they are, because they are not directly affecting us. I encourage those of you reading this article to look at the Instagram influencers I have mentioned as well as the hashtag #Iamsudanrevolution. There you will find countless posts, articles, links, and organizations that can inform you, help you, and guide you on how you can help. For immediate action, check out Cargle’s post which is a picture of protestors with SUDAN in bold, blue letters and the subtitle of Information & Support Round Up. There you will find the link to the master document which will provide the beginning of any information you want to know. 

I must repeat—acting as a bystander perpetuates the actions that are harming individuals because it is neglecting them the action they need. Use your privilege for something productive. 

OLIVIA HAMMOND is an undergraduate at Emerson College in Boston, Massachusetts. She studies Creative Writing, with minors in Sociology/Anthropology and Marketing. She has travelled to seven different countries, most recently studying abroad this past summer in the Netherlands. She has a passion for words, traveling, and learning in any form. 

Don’t Blame Sharia for Islamic Extremism – Blame Colonialism

Warning that Islamic extremists want to impose fundamentalist religious rule in American communities, right-wing lawmakers in dozens of U.S. states have tried banning Sharia, an Arabic term often understood to mean Islamic law.

These political debates – which cite terrorism and political violence in the Middle East to argue that Islam is incompatible with modern society – reinforce stereotypes that the Muslim world is uncivilized.

They also reflect ignorance of Sharia, which is not a strict legal code. Sharia means “path” or “way”: It is a broad set of values and ethical principles drawn from the Quran – Islam’s holy book – and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. As such, different people and governments may interpret Sharia differently.

Still, this is not the first time that the world has tried to figure out where Sharia fits into the global order.

In the 1950s and 1960s, when Great Britain, France and other European powers relinquished their colonies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, leaders of newly sovereign Muslim-majority countries faced a decision of enormous consequence: Should they build their governments on Islamic religious values or embrace the European laws inherited from colonial rule?

The big debate

Invariably, my historical research shows, political leaders of these young countries chose to keep their colonial justice systems rather than impose religious law.

Newly independent Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia, among other places, all confined the application of Sharia to marital and inheritance disputes within Muslim families, just as their colonial administrators had done. The remainder of their legal systems would continue to be based on European law.

France, Italy and the United Kingdom imposed their legal systems onto Muslim-majority territories they colonized. CIA Norman B. Leventhal Map Center, CC BY

To understand why they chose this course, I researched the decision-making process in Sudan, the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from the British, in 1956.

In the national archives and libraries of the Sudanese capital Khartoum, and in interviews with Sudanese lawyers and officials, I discovered that leading judges, politicians and intellectuals actually pushed for Sudan to become a democratic Islamic state.

They envisioned a progressive legal system consistent with Islamic faithprinciples, one where all citizens – irrespective of religion, race or ethnicity – could practice their religious beliefs freely and openly.

“The People are equal like the teeth of a comb,” wrote Sudan’s soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Hassan Muddathir in 1956, quoting the Prophet Muhammad, in an official memorandum I found archived in Khartoum’s Sudan Library. “An Arab is no better than a Persian, and the White is no better than the Black.”

Sudan’s post-colonial leadership, however, rejected those calls. They chose to keep the English common law tradition as the law of the land.

Why keep the laws of the oppressor?

My research identifies three reasons why early Sudan sidelined Sharia: politics, pragmatism and demography.

Rivalries between political parties in post-colonial Sudan led to parliamentary stalemate, which made it difficult to pass meaningful legislation. So Sudan simply maintained the colonial laws already on the books.

There were practical reasons for maintaining English common law, too.

Sudanese judges had been trained by British colonial officials. So they continued to apply English common law principles to the disputes they heard in their courtrooms.

Sudan’s founding fathers faced urgent challenges, such as creating the economy, establishing foreign trade and ending civil war. They felt it was simply not sensible to overhaul the rather smooth-running governance system in Khartoum.

The Sudanese city of Suakim in 1884 or 1885, just prior to British colonial rule. The National Archives UK

The continued use of colonial law after independence also reflected Sudan’s ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity.

Then, as now, Sudanese citizens spoke many languages and belonged to dozens of ethnic groups. At the time of Sudan’s independence, people practicing Sunni and Sufi traditions of Islam lived largely in northern Sudan. Christianity was an important faith in southern Sudan.

Sudan’s diversity of faith communities meant that maintaining a foreign legal system – English common law – was less controversial than choosing whose version of Sharia to adopt.

Why extremists triumphed

My research uncovers how today’s instability across the Middle East and North Africa is, in part, a consequence of these post-colonial decisions to reject Sharia.

In maintaining colonial legal systems, Sudan and other Muslim-majority countries that followed a similar path appeased Western world powers, which were pushing their former colonies toward secularism.

But they avoided resolving tough questions about religious identity and the law. That created a disconnect between the people and their governments.

In the long run, that disconnect helped fuel unrest among some citizens of deep faith, leading to sectarian calls to unite religion and the state once and for all. In Iran, Saudi Arabia and parts of Somalia and Nigeria, these interpretations triumphed, imposing extremist versions of Sharia over millions of people.

In other words, Muslim-majority countries stunted the democratic potential of Sharia by rejecting it as a mainstream legal concept in the 1950s and 1960s, leaving Sharia in the hands of extremists.

But there is no inherent tension between Sharia, human rights and the rule of law. Like any use of religion in politics, Sharia’s application depends on who is using it – and why.

Leaders of places like Saudi Arabia and Brunei have chosen to restrict women’s freedom and minority rights. But many scholars of Islam and grassroots organizations interpret Sharia as a flexible, rights-oriented and equality-minded ethical order.

Women in Saudi Arabia have campaigned for gender equality, including the right to drive cars. Reuters/Faisal Nasser

Religion and the law worldwide

Religion is woven into the legal fabric of many post-colonial nations, with varying consequences for democracy and stability.

After its 1948 founding, Israel debated the role of Jewish law in Israeli society. Ultimately, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his allies opted for a mixed legal system that combined Jewish law with English common law.

In Latin America, the Catholicism imposed by Spanish conquistadors underpins laws restricting abortion, divorce and gay rights.

And throughout the 19th century, judges in the U.S. regularly invoked the legal maxim that “Christianity is part of the common law.” Legislators still routinely invoke their Christian faith when supporting or opposing a given law.

Political extremism and human rights abuses that occur in those places are rarely understood as inherent flaws of these religions.

When it comes to Muslim-majority countries, however, Sharia takes the blame for regressive laws – not the people who pass those policies in the name of religion.

Fundamentalism and violence, in other words, are a post-colonial problem – not a religious inevitability.

For the Muslim world, finding a system of government that reflects Islamic values while promoting democracy will not be easy after more than 50 years of failed secular rule. But building peace may demand it.

MARK FATHI MASSOUD is an Associate Professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

THIS ARTICLE WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED ON THE CONVERSATION

How Sudan’s Protesters Upped the Ante, and Forced Al-Bashir from Power

Following months of protests, and a prolonged sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was placed under house arrest on April 11 as the country’s military prepared for a transitional government.

Many have described the Sudanese uprising as a “bread protest” against a rise in inflation. In fact the Sudanese people took to the streets for much more than a struggling economy, or the price of bread. They have been calling for freedom, peace, justice and the downfall of the regime.

And they have finally won.

The generation leading the uprising was born and raised during al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. The protesters are mostly young professionals who have been directly affected by the regime’s Islamisation and Arabisation policies.

These policies have been particularly harsh against women’s freedoms and rights, which explains why young Sudanese women are at the heart of the uprising. The policies have also resulted in multiple years of conflict and insecurity in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile.

Sudan’s governing system has already deteriorated because of years of state autocracy, nepotism, corruption and violent conflict.

Al-Bashir’s removal may bring down the state if a strong successor isn’t positioned to replace him. But in my view, given how Sudan has historically been run, the democratic preferences of many young protesters is unlikely to come to fruition. Their expectations for a functioning democracy, with free and fair elections, and constitutional freedoms will not be met unless the next leader of Sudan is a reformist.

Al-Bashir’s first responses

The regime responded to the protests in three ways.

First, al-Bashir tried to quickly reconsolidate his power by proposing constitutional changes that would have allowed him to stand for reelection in 2020. That was quickly taken off the table.

He then declared a year-long nationwide state of emergency. The emergency state prohibited “unauthorised” gatherings and movements. Violence followed as the state deployed heavy-handed tactics to break up the protests.

Al-Bashir also dissolved federal and state governments, replacing almost all of Sudan’s 18 state governors with army officers. And he ordered parliament to delay deliberations over proposed constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for an extra-constitutional term in next year’s elections.

When the protests didn’t subside he called for broad-based dialogue.

In a bid to stay in power, al-Bashir also reached out to those who had backed him financially on previous occasions. These included the Persian Gulf states as well as Egypt and Russia. However, these allies have done little more than offer him vague statements of support.

Read more: How foreign backing is keeping Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in power

He also began to lose the support of Western backers. Once warm to al-Bashir, they recently began to issue stern reprimands.

The protests

By the time al-Bashir stepped down protests had taken hold in more than 35 cities across the country. People took to the streets in more and more places following the first demonstration in the northern Nile-side town of Atbara.

The current uprising was triggered by a government decision to lift subsidies on essential commodities and to drastically increase bread prices. In a matter of weeks, the protest in Atbara would reach the capital Khartoum 349 kilometres away.

As protests erupted across the country agents of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Service and riot police began to crack down on demonstrators. Throughout, however, the army refrained from intervening. Rumours began to surface that al-Bashir was ready to hand over power to the armed force. But this was swiftly rejected by the Minister of Information and government spokesman of the government, Hassan Ismail.

In the final days before al-Bashir stepped down thousands of demonstrators reached the ministry compound in Khartoum. This also houses al-Bashir’s residence, the secret service headquarters and the defence ministry.

Protesters then upped the stakes by trying to gain support from the army. What began to emerge was that senior officers were possibly weakening, or that they were hoping to use the protests to pressure factions within the ruling elite.

Protesters used a number of tactics to keep the momentum going. These included using social media such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. All evolved during the uprising despite the government’s attempts to block the user, and Virtual Private Networks were used to access the women’s only Facebook group called “Minbar Chat”.

Videos recorded by the protesters became important in documenting the crimes perpetrated by the security forces during the peaceful protests. They also became the main means of informing the Sudanese people and the international community about the brutality of al-Bashir’s regime.

Now that al-Bashir has resigned he will probably be required to leave the country by agreeing to safe passage to a friendly state, possibly somewhere like Egypt, or Qatar. The only way he can remain in Sudan is if he had prior agreement with the military to ensure his safety. It’s possible that the new generals he appointed after the declaration of a state of emergency might side with him.

Their support could have been one of the reasons why he felt that he could step down. Looking ahead, with or without Bashir, there’s also a possibility that the protests could continue if the people of Sudan feel that the swamp has not been drained of all the regime’s oppressive leaders.

ANDREW EDWARD TCHIE is an Editor at the Armed Conflict Database; a Research Fellow at the Conflict, Security and Development at International Institute for Strategic Studies at University of Essex.

THIS ARTICLE WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED ON THE CONVERSATION

ETHIOPIA: The Omo Valley

The lower Omo Valley near the borders of Kenya and Sudan, is home to some of the most fascinating tribes on the continent of Africa and around the world. This land frozen in time is inhabited by different ethnic groups with ancient traditions that have remained untouched for centuries.